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In situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver, I study how strategic
reporting affects the incentives to search for information. Research provides series of signals that can
be used selectively in reporting. I show that the sender is strictly worse off whenhis research effort is not
observed by the receiver: he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equi-
librium, discloses all the information he obtained. However this extra research can be socially bene-
ficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing. Finally I identify cases where
the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive.
In 2002, editors of eleven of the most prestigious medical journals, announced that they
would only publish the results of studies that were entered at their start in a publicly
available database.1 Pharmaceutical firms conduct clinical trials to test the efficacy and
potential side-effects of their drugs and to compare them to competitors products.
Publishing results of studies is an efficient way to influence doctors prescriptions and
patients tastes. However, firms can conductmultiple trials and select themost favourable
results. The system of mandatory disclosure adopted by medical journals is a response to
the fear of such selective publishing.2 It makes the research effort of pharmaceutical
firms more observable and will influence both the information they disclose and the
amount of research they perform. In the present article I study the interaction between
the research and disclosure decisions, which is an essential element inmany settings. The
adoption of mandatory disclosure rules has subtle effects and I discover that leaving the
research effort unobservable can sometimes be socially beneficial.3
I study the interaction between research and disclosure in a model where a biased
sender searches for information and communicates it strategically to a receiver who will
take a decision impacting both their welfare.4 The quality of the decision depends on
the value of an underlying state. I suppose that the information that the sender pro-
vides on the state is verifiable, so that he can withhold some evidence but cannot
fabricate it. The sender first determines how much research to perform and, once the
results are obtained, what to disclose to the receiver.
* I thank David Baron, Prakash Kannan, Marco Ottaviani, Bernard Salanie and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne
and participants at Alicante, LBS, PSE, Stanford and the European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory
for useful comments. The editor, Leonardo Felli and two anonymous referees helped greatly improve this
article. Finally I thank particularly Douglas Benrheim for his advice and support.
1 This announcement was confirmed in September 2004. This applies to studies started after 1 September
2005. See declarations by the International Committee of Medical Journals ICMJE.
2 The system prevents the selective publishing of positive results: to be allowed to submit the results for
publication, the trial needs to be registered initially, before the results are known. Note that similarly, in
reaction to a series of scandals, the US Congress enacted in September 2007 the FDA Amendments Act which
strengthens the disclosure requirements firms face.
3 I will show however that, in the case of clinical trials, mandatory disclosure can have additional benefits
that will tend to dominate.
4 In the previous example the sender is the pharmaceutical firm and the receiver is the doctor who will
decide whether to prescribe the drug, thus influencing the firm’s profits.
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The research technology is a central element of this model. I view research as
having two essential functions for the sender. It increases his knowledge of the state
but also provides pieces of evidence that can be used selectively to influence the
receiver.5 This second function is the main focus of this article. I refer to it as the
strategic function of research. To study this alternative function explicitly, I had to
propose a different model of research than the one commonly used in the literature.6
In my model, I view the outcome of research as a series of infinitesimal positive or
negative signals, interpreted as the results of a series of small experiments. The
aggregate amount of positive signals is informative about the state. In this context,
increasing the amount of research performed, improves the knowledge of the sender
but also produces more positive signals that can be used to mislead the decision
maker.
In this environment, I show that the sender conducts more research when his
research effort is not observed by the receiver. However, in equilibrium he reveals all
the information he obtained and is strictly worse off than if his research effort was
observable.7 Indeed, in the unobservable case, if the quantity of research the receiver
expects is too low, the sender will have an incentive to search further, obtain more
favourable evidence, conceal the unfavourable one and thus mislead the receiver into
believing the state is higher. The receiver understands these incentives and knows that
extra research will be conducted to mislead her, up to the point where the marginal
costs equal the marginal benefits. In equilibrium, the receiver therefore knows, though
she does not observe, the amount of research performed and the sender is forced to
reveal all the information he obtained, as if the research effort was observable. The
sender is thus strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver.
He has to incur the cost of extra research to convince her that he is not hiding any
evidence, the cost of proving his honesty.
This initial important result, which rests on the strategic function of research, is used
to discuss the benefits of introducing mandatory disclosure rules. I show that, under a
condition that I derive, social welfare is greater when the research effort is not observed
by the receiver. The sender, when he determines his research effort, ignores the
benefits to the receiver of obtaining better information. In the unobservable case, the
extra amount of research conducted to show that no information is withheld, can
correct this ignored externality. Whether it corrects exactly or excessively determines
which system is socially preferred. In particular, if the bias of the sender is not too large,
mandatory disclosure proves to be socially costly.
In the second part of the article I tailor the model to examine in details two specific
applications. This leads me to derive further results. I first concentrate on the applica-
tion to clinical trials. In the benchmark model, the receiver is sophisticated and fully
informed about the bias and the research technology. As a consequence, in equilib-
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5 To illustrate the second function, suppose the receiver expects the sender to run two experiments. It
might be optimal for the sender to incur the cost of five experiments and to report only the two most
favourable results.
6 In most of the literature, research is modelled as a binary decision: either the sender does not search or
he searches and incurs a cost c to obtain one signal that is informative with a certain probability. This model
does not allow us to study situations where sequences of signals are obtained and used selectively in reporting.
Note that we compare these two models in more detail in Sections 2 and 5.
7 The sender in equilibrium uses a full disclosure strategy.
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rium, the sender reveals all the information he obtained. Both the assumptions and the
conclusions seem too strong in the case of clinical trials.8
I therefore examine the case where the sender may, with some probability, face a
credulous receiver who will believe all the information provided to her. The sender
will then report the same number of positive signals as in the benchmark model but
hide some negative results to induce the naive receiver to set his preferred policy. In
such a situation, although the effect on research incentives identified in the bench-
mark model still exists, mandatory disclosure becomes more attractive as it leads to
the implementation of the policy preferred by the receiver.9 In a second extension, I
relax the assumption that the receiver is fully informed about preferences. Specific-
ally, I suppose that the receiver is uncertain about the bias of the sender. I show that
in such circumstances, some information will be withheld in equilibrium. The sender
might even conceal positive information arguing in his favour, to avoid revealing his
type.
The second application I examine is the case of litigation in adversarial systems. I
introduce two competing senders with opposed preferences and I find that when they
compete to provide information, they conduct less research than if they were alone
reporting. Given that the competitor is revealing information, the possibilities to mis-
lead the receiver are more limited and therefore the senders need to conduct less
research to prove that they are not dissimulating evidence. I also show that it is socially
optimal to rest the burden of proof exclusively on the most biased agent.
The two applications that I study in more depth lead me to some interesting
extensions of the model. I want to point out that there are other applications where the
interplay between research and disclosure is an essential feature. For instance, the
model can be applied to interest groups providing evidence to influence a decision
maker. These lobby groups need to decide how much research to perform and what
evidence to present.10 The model can also be used to study media bias. The literature
on this issue has sometimes considered journalists as having a desire to influence
opinions of their readers or being subject to influence by politicians.11 This bias can
affect their search for information and their reporting of facts. Finally, the model can
also more directly address the organisation of academia. A researcher is generally
biased towards finding an interesting or surprising result. It is often expected that a
certain number of robustness checks need to be presented. My model suggests that a
socially excessive amount of tests could be conducted if they mostly serve to guarantee
that no information has been withheld rather than to provide extra information.
I discuss the links to the existing literature in the final Section to allow for an in-
formed comparison. Persuasion games, in which a sender communicates verifiable
information to a receiver, who will take a decision affecting both their welfare have long
been of interest in the literature – in particular in Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1986). Milgrom’s unravelling result, shows that, when the decision maker
knows the quantity of information held by the sender, in every sequential equilibrium of
8 Several scandals that I discuss in Section 3 revealed that pharmaceutical firms withheld negative results of
trials and that the doctors and the public remained unaware of that fact.
9 This is true if the welfare of the receiver is more important than the welfare of the sender.
10 See Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002, 2006).
11 See Baron (2006), Besley and Prat (2006) and Xiang and Sarvary (2007).
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the game, I will observe full disclosure.12 In these results, as in most of the literature, the
information at the disposal of the sender is exogenously given.13 My initial contribution
is to endogenise the search for information and to show that the interaction between
research and disclosure has important effects, in particular on the sender’s welfare. My
second contribution is to study the social benefits of introducing mandatory disclosure.
My article is organised as follows. In Section 1 I present the model. In Section 2 I
study the interaction between research and disclosure and derive the main results of
the article. I also examine the social benefits of mandatory disclosure. In Section 3 I
discuss the application to clinical trials and extend the model to allow for potentially
credulous receivers and uncertainty on the sender’s type. In Section 4 I use the model
to study trials in adversarial systems and therefore introduce competing senders. Finally
in Section 5 I discuss the links with the existing literature.
1. Model
1.1. Description of the Model
We consider a persuasion game where the information is not exogenously given but
obtained at a cost by the sender. The unknown state of interest is denoted h 2 [0,1].
The sender and the receiver initially share a common prior p(h) on the state.
The sender has access to a research technology that can provide information on the
state. He initially decides on the quantity Q of research he will perform at a unit cost C.
A central focus of the article will be to compare cases where Q is observed by the
receiver to cases where it is unobservable. The outcome of research is a series of
infinitesimal positive and negative signals which are privately observed by the sender.
These signals can be interpreted as the results of a series of small experiments, as small
pieces of evidence.14 More specifically, if the sender conducts an amount Q of research,
he will obtain x positive signals given by the distribution f(xjh, Q). This aggregate
amount of positive signals x provides information on the value of h: the sender can
derive a posterior distribution on the state g(hjx, Q). I describe this research technology
in more details in the next Section.
Once the research is performed, the sender can report a subset or all of the evidence
to the receiver. I suppose throughout the article that the evidence is verifiable. We
denote r the quantity of positive signals the sender reports. The verifiability of the
information imposes the constraint: r  x (the sender cannot fabricate information
and cannot therefore report more positive signals than he obtained). We use the
formulation of Milgrom (1981) and call a strategy of full disclosure a reporting strategy
that leads the receiver to set the same policy as if he observed all the signals.15
The receiver sets the policy p 2 <. Both the sender and the receiver are affected by
p but they have diverging interests which could lead the sender to report select-
12 The intuition is that, if some information is withheld, the decision maker considers the worst case
scenario, updates her beliefs accordingly and thus the sender will always prefer to reveal all his information.
13 One exception is a paper by Shavell (1994) that I discuss extensively in Section 5.
14 To be more precise, I consider the continuous approximation of this series of binary signals. In that
sense, signals are infinitesimal.
15 A strategy where all the positive signals are reported, all the negative signals are withheld and the
receiver understands that the hidden signals are negative is a full disclosure reporting strategy.
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ively. More specifically, given a state h and a policy p, the welfare of the receiver is
given by ur(p,h) ¼ (p  h)2 whereas the welfare of the sender is us(p,h) ¼
(p  h  d)2CQ.16 The parameter d measures the extent of the sender’s bias.17
To summarise, the timing of the model is the following:
(1) the sender decides on Q, quantity of research to perform
(2) the sender conducts Q and obtains signals
(3) the sender reports to the receiver a subset or all of these signals
(4) the receiver observes the report and sets the policy p.
1.2. Research Technology
I have chosen to model the outcome of research as a series of infinitesimal experiments
yielding either positive or negative results. As I pointed out in the introduction, in most
of the literature, the search for information is modelled as a draw of a unique signal,
informative with a certain probability. This is not adapted to address the questions
raised in this article for a number of reasons. First, I set out to understand how, when
multiple results are obtained, they can be selectively reported. My model allows me to
study the exact opportunities senders have to mislead receivers: by conducting more
research, a sender can accumulate more positive signals and can replace some of the
negative signals he would have reported, by this more favourable evidence. Second,
the model I chose to represent the research process allows me to measure explicitly the
amount of research performed and to conduct comparative statics on this variable.
I introduce some further notations and assumptions on the research technology.
I denote:
• g(x, Q) the unconditional distribution of signals
• g(hjx, Q) the posterior distribution of the state given the signals and the amount
of research performed
• Var[hjx, Q] the conditional variance of the posterior distribution of h given the
signals and the amount of research performed
I make the following assumptions:
(i) f(xjh, Q) is continuously differentiable with respect to Q.
(ii)
R1
0 Varðh;Q Þ g ðx;Q Þ dx is decreasing and convex in Q.
Assumption (ii) posits that the more research is performed, the more precise its
outcome becomes on average: on average the variance of the posterior decreases with
Q. The marginal gains in precision are therefore decreasing in Q. This is a reasonable
property for the results of experiments: if a researcher conducts more research, he
becomes better informed but the marginal gains in understanding decrease as his
knowledge improves.
16 CQ is the amount spent by the sender on research. The utility of the sender is therefore assumed to be
quasi separable in money.
17 Indeed, if the state is known, the receiver’s preferred policy p equals h, whereas the sender’s ideal policy
is p ¼ h þ d.
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Finally, it is important to note that throughout this article, I concentrate on pure
strategy equilibria. I show at various points in the text that the qualitative results would
not be affected if I considered mixed strategy equilibria.
2. The Cost of Proving Your Honesty
2.1. Disclosure of Research Results
One of the important goals of this article is to compare cases where the research effort
is observable to cases where it is unobservable. I show that this difference has important
consequences, both in terms of social and individual welfare. In particular I show that
the sender is always strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the
receiver. I concentrate on sequential equilibria of this game.18 I start by presenting the
results in the observable case.
Proposition 1. All sequential equilibria of the game with observable research effort are
characterised by:
(i) The seller uses a strategy of full disclosure.
(ii) The sender conducts an amount of research Q0 solution to:
C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼Q0
Proof. See Appendix.
Result (i) states that the policy will be set as if the receiver observed all the
information obtained by the sender. There could be multiple reporting strategies
corresponding to this behaviour. In all of those, the sender reveals all his positive
signals and the receiver understands that all the information that is withheld is
negative.19 This result follows the unravelling result in Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1986). When the receiver knows the amount of research performed, her
belief in a sequential equilibrium, if some information is withheld, is one of extreme
scepticism. Thus the sender does not have incentives to withhold information. Given
this reporting strategy, result (ii) states that the sender will conduct an amount of
research such that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefits from getting better
information (i.e benefits from decreasing the variance of the posterior). Note how-
ever that he does not take into account the benefits of better information for the
receiver.
I now turn to the case where the quantity of research performed by the sender is not
observed by the receiver. In this case research not only serves to provide better informa-
tion but also has a strategic function for the sender: conducting more research allows
18 For instance there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the receiver ignores all the information provided
to him and the sender does not communicate any evidence. Given that the information is verifiable, if it is
provided to him, it is unreasonable for the receiver to ignore it.
19 Here are two examples of full disclosure reporting strategies. In the first, all the information held by the
sender is revealed to the receiver. In the second, all positive signals are revealed and all negative withheld.
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him to accumulate more positive evidence and potentially report selectively. This
strategic function that I unveil underlies the results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. All sequential equilibria of the game with unobservable research effort are
characterised by:
(i) The sender uses a strategy of full disclosure.
(ii) The sender conducts an amount of research Q solution to:
C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼Q 
 2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼Q  f ðxjh;Q Þf ðhÞdxdh
(iii) More research is performed than when the research effort is observable: Q0 < Q
.
(iv) The sender is strictly worse off than if his research effort was observable.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that in equilibrium, the sender conducts more research in the
unobservable case (result (iii)) but in equilibrium uses a reporting strategy that reveals
all the information he obtained (result (i)) and as a consequence would strictly prefer
his research effort to be observed (result (iv)). I now provide the intuition for these
results.
Let me start with result (iii). Suppose the receiver expects the sender to conduct the
low amount of research Q0 as in the observable case. The sender will have an incentive
to search further and obtain more positive signals. He will then still report the quantity
of signals the receiver expects, but replace some negative signals by positive ones to
mislead her. The receiver understands these incentives and knows that extra research
will be conducted to mislead her, up to the point where the marginal benefits equal the
costs. This trade-off characterises the equilibrium amount of research Q as expressed
in the equation of result (ii).
Result (ii) states that in equilibrium the marginal cost of research C equals the
marginal benefits, composed of two terms. The first term represents, as in the
observable case, the marginal benefits from obtaining a better knowledge of the state
(i.e decreasing the variance of the posterior). The second term corresponds to the
strategic function of research: it represents the potential benefits from conducting
more research in order to obtain more positive signals and thus mislead the receiver.20
The case of medical journals mentioned in the Introduction gives some partial
evidence in support of result (iii). Editors of eleven of the most prestigious medical
20 I note that the amount of research conducted in equilibrium would be identical if the infinitesimal
messages were only informative with probability r. Given an equilibrium amount of research Q  and a report
r, the receiver would set a policy r/rQ . By choosing a quantity of research Q 0, the sender would therefore
expect to obtain rhQ 0 signals and induce the policy rhQ 0/rQ  ¼ hQ 0/Q . All the derivations are therefore
identical to those of Proposition 2 and the equilibrium amount of research conducted is the same.
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journals announced that they would only publish the results of studies that were
entered at their start in a publicly available database, starting September 2005.21 In
effect, these journals decided to move from a system where the research effort was
unobservable to one where it could be at least partially observed. I collected data on the
publications of one of the journals that committed to this system, the New England
Journal of Medicine and recorded the number of published studies that were sponsored
by an industrial group, presumably the most biased studies.22 We see in Table 1, that
this percentage decreased consistently after the adoption of the disclosure rule.23
Overall, the percentage of publications sponsored by a pharmaceutical group
decreased from 25% to 18%.24 This is suggestive, although imperfect, evidence that
adopting a system with observable research effort decreases the amount of research
performed in equilibrium by biased agents.25
Result (i) states that, in equilibrium, although the sender performs more research
and his research effort is unobservable, he uses a reporting strategy that reveals all the
information he obtained. The intuition is that the receiver knows all the parameters of
the game and thus, in equilibrium, can compute, though she cannot observe, the
quantity of information obtained by the sender. Therefore, Milgrom’s unravelling
result applies as in Proposition 1. I point out however that this result relies both on the
sophistication of the receiver and on the assumption that the receiver has perfect
knowledge of all the parameters of the game (preferences, cost of research...). I show in
Section 3 that if these conditions are relaxed, withholding of negative and sometimes
positive results will occur in equilibrium.
An important consequence of the previous results is that the sender is strictly worse
off when his research effort is unobservable (result (iv)). In equilibrium the receiver
can determine how much research was conducted and the sender is forced to reveal all
Table 1
Percentage of Publications in NEJM Sponsored by a Pharmaceutical Company
Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
04 04 04 04 05 05 05 05
Before Mand. Disclosure 26 31 37 25 20 6 26 29
Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
05 05 05 05 06 06 06 06
After Mand. Disclosure 16 7 26 11 14 20 24 25
21 See declaration by ICMJE.
22 The ideal would have been to obtain the percentage of submitted studies sponsored by pharmaceutical
companies but the journal editors did not keep information about sponsors for all of the manuscripts sent to
them. However, note that during that period, the number of submissions to the New England Journal of
Medicine was rather stable (3,430 submissions in 2004 and 3,595 in 2005).
23 It decreased in every month except for the months of July and April.
24 This is a significant difference at the 10% level.
25 This is imperfect evidence given that (a) it is still early to judge the effect of such requirements as these
studies take time (b) there are only data on publications and therefore I am implicitly assuming that the ratio
of publication to research is constant (c) most importantly pharmaceutical companies have concerns other
than publication that can encourage them to conduct research although this is an important channel to
communicate results to doctors.
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the information he obtained (result (ii)). The situation is as if the sender’s research
effort was observable. However, when his research effort is observable, his optimal
choice is to conduct a lower amount of research Q0 (result (iii)). The extra research he
performs therefore decreases his welfare. The sender has to incur an extra cost just to
prove his honesty, to demonstrate he is not hiding any evidence. This extra cost, as the
following corollary suggests, could have important consequences.
Corollary 1. The amount of additional costly research conducted when the research effort is
unobservable is increasing in the bias: Q  Q0 is increasing in d.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 states that the cost a sender needs to incur to prove his honesty is increasing
in his bias. Consider the application of the model to lobbying. Moderate environmental
NGOs such as the National Research Defence Council tend to lobby decision makers
directly, providing, for instance, detailed reports produced by their own scientists. Groups
such as Greenpeace, considered to hold more extreme views, favour public actions and
demonstrations. Corollary 1 suggests that part of the explanation is that informational
lobbying is much more costly for extreme groups given that they need to provide more
evidence to the decision maker to prove they are not withholding information.
2.2. Welfare Impact of Mandatory Disclosure
I have shown in the previous Section that the welfare of the sender is greater when his
research effort is observed by the receiver. However, I have not yet determined the
overall impact on social welfare. I address this in the following proposition and in
particular I determine the consequences of implementing mandatory disclosure rules.
Adopting mandatory disclosure is equivalent to moving from a system where the
research effort is unobservable to one where it is observable.26
Proposition 3. Under the following condition, mandatory disclosure decreases social welfare:
2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼QW f ðxjh;QW Þf ðhÞdxdh <
C
2
where QW is the socially optimal amount of research given by:
C
2
¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Var h;Qð Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼QW
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 provides a sufficient condition for the surprising result that mandatory
disclosure decreases social welfare. The intuition is that the sender does not take into
26 The rules could require the disclosure of the research effort, not the results, as in the case of the medical
journals. My previous results show that this does not matter. Indeed if the research effort is observable, the
sender will in equilibrium disclose all the information he obtained. Intuitively, if a pharmaceutical company
registers a trial initially and does not disclose the result, it can be inferred that these results were unsatis-
factory.
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account the benefits of his research for the receiver and therefore, when the research
effort is observable, conducts a socially insufficient amount of research (Q0 < QW
where QW is the social optimum). In the unobservable case, the strategic consideration
increases the amount of research conducted in equilibrium and can potentially correct
the ignored externality. The sufficient condition in Proposition 3 guarantees that the
strategic function does not actually overcorrect and lead to an excessive research effort.
Corollary 2. There exists d > 0 such that mandatory disclosure decreases social welfare if
and only if d  d.
If the bias of the sender is not too large, the socially optimal arrangement is one
where the receiver does not observe the research effort of the sender. The intuition is
that the ignored externality is independent of the bias of the sender.27 On the contrary,
the strategic function is increasing in the bias. Therefore, if the bias is large, the
strategic consideration overcorrects this externality. However, when the bias is small,
this extra research conducted to prove that no information is withheld will be socially
valuable.28
Furthermore, mandatory disclosure only seems easily implementable when the
relation between the sender and the receiver is well established and formalised. This is
the case for pharmaceutical companies and medical journals. It is also the case for
lawyers and juries.29 However it seems harder to implement in situations such as the
communication between an interest group and a politician. In these cases taxing
research used to influence can be an alternative method. The previous results can be
reinterpreted in the following way.
Corollary 3. The optimal tax (or subsidy) in the case of lump sum redistribution (or tax)
when research is unobservable is given by:
s ¼ 2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðhx;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼QW f ðxjh;QW Þf ðhÞdxdh
C
2
:
The social optimum is always attainable with a tax or a subsidy. As was emphasised in
Proposition 3, whether s is a tax or subsidy depends on whether the strategic con-
siderations in the unobservable case overcorrect the ignored externality. I also
emphasise that throughout this article I use a very specific context where research is
used not only to attain better knowledge of the phenomenon but also to influence a
decision maker. I do not make any statements about taxing research in general.30
Finally, note that an alternative to taxing research would be to tax reports directly, for
instance tax lobby groups for the time spent with a politician or the amount of
27 Note that the fact the externality is independent of the bias of the sender is true because of quadratic
preferences. Other assumptions on preferences might therefore change our results.
28 We point out once again that this is reliant on the sophistication of the receiver and we show in Section 3
that considering naive receivers can increase the attractiveness of mandatory disclosure.
29 I could imagine a similar system where lawyers would need to declare, at the start of the case, funds they
spend searching for evidence, to be able to use the results during the trial.
30 I also emphasise that the tax does not make the research effort observable. The tax declaration sub-
mitted to the IRS is not available to the public, and even if it were it would be hard to allocate an aggregate
amount to different issues. Furthermore, an alternative solution could be to tax the research providers.
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information provided. This would tend to have the same effects but would target
directly research used to influence the decision maker.
In the next Sections I consider a number of applications of my model that lead me to
relax some assumptions of the benchmark model and derive some further results. The
first application, which I have already mentioned, is the reporting of clinical trial results
by pharmaceutical firms. I tailor my model to this setting, and introduce in turn,
credulous receivers and receivers uncertain about senders preferences. I show it
changes the full disclosure conclusion and the welfare impact of mandatory disclosure.
The second application focuses on cases with competing senders, for instance trials in
adversarial regimes.
In some of these extensions, I use a special version of the model that isolates the
strategic function of research. Specifically, I suppose that the distribution of signals
takes the particular functional form f(x j h,Q) ¼ 1x¼hQ: if the sender conducts an
amount Q of research, he knows for sure he will obtain hQ positive signals and will
therefore be able to infer the exact value of the state. Research is immediately informa-
tive and thus the social optimum and the equilibrium amount of research in the
observable case is to conduct and infinitesimal amount of research. Nevertheless,
Proposition 2 applied to this special case indicates that in the unobservable case, the
sender is forced to conduct a strictly positive amount of research Q ¼ 2dE(h)/C. This
model, therefore isolates the strategic function of research. The extra amount of
research the sender performs when his research effort is not observed by the receiver is
socially wasteful but, as I emphasised in this Section, serves the purpose of convincing
the receiver of the sender’s honesty.
3. Reporting of Clinical Trials
Recent scandals in the pharmaceutical industry, such as the Vioxx case (an anti-
inflammatory drug proven to increase the risk of cardiovascular events) or the Paxil
case (an anti-depressant that could increase the suicide rates among children), have
attracted the public’s interest in the possible withholding of negative results by phar-
maceutical companies. Medical journals and regulatory authorities are increasingly
focused on this issue. Legislation of disclosure started with the FDA Modernisation Act
of 1997 that established a public clinical trials registry (clinicaltrials.gov) and called for
the registration of trials for serious or life threatening diseases. This law did not
fundamentally change the habits in the industry. For instance it was reported that by
2002 only 48% of cancer drug trials had been registered. Recent scandals prompted
new efforts to regulate disclosure, leading to the FDA Amendment Acts in September
2007 that mandate the disclosure of a larger set of trials.
The results of Section 2 highlight a potential adverse effect of mandatory disclosure
that has been generally ignored in the debates on these issues. Forcing the senders to
disclose their results can decrease the amount of research performed in equilibrium.
These results suggest that the adoption of a system of mandatory disclosure should be
accompanied by measures to encourage research. In Section 2 I presented suggestive
evidence on the effect of disclosure requirements on publication rates in medical
journals. I believe other pieces of evidence could be exploited. For instance, stronger
disclosure requirements could also have an impact on the number of trials aimed at
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finding new applications for existing drugs. Pharmaceutical firms could refrain from
conducting such tests out of fear of finding negative side-effects of their already com-
mercialised products. Based on information I collected from the FDA website, the
number of efficacy supplements approvals decreased from 107 in 2004 to 96 in 2005 and
85 in 2006 and 2007.31 These types of trials are designed to test new indications, new
dosage or new routes of application of already approved drugs. Note that 2004 was the
year when most of the scandals made headlines and when regulatory authorities became
increasingly focused on these issues. This can be seen as suggestive evidence that
mandatory disclosure can reduce or change the focus of research efforts and underlines
the fact that more systematic empirical work along those lines needs to be conducted.
Themodel I used in the previous Section allowedme to highlight this interesting effect
of disclosure requirements on research incentives. However, some of the conclusions do
not seem in accordance with our motivational example. For instance, one of the striking
results of the previous Section is that, in equilibrium, the sender employs a full disclosure
reporting strategy. This conclusion seems at odds with the example of the drug Vioxx
where the public was initially unaware of the potentially lethal side-effects of the drug.
This result in my model is due to the sophistication of the receiver and to her perfect
knowledge of the environment. In this Section I adopt different approaches to tailor our
model more closely to the application to clinical trials. I discover that the conclusion
relative to overall social welfare is in certain cases modified.
3.1. Credulous Receivers
The model I used in Section 2 assumed that the receiver was highly sophisticated. This
assumption seems particularly strong in the context of the application to clinical trials.
Not all doctors have the time or experience to determine what type of evidence could
be withheld by pharmaceutical firms. They might not update their beliefs based on non
disclosure of certain tests. To account for this feature, I modify my benchmark model
slightly. I suppose that the receiver of the information can be of two types: she is either
sophisticated (with probability q) or credulous (with probability 1  q). The sophistic-
ated type is identical to the receiver in the benchmark model: she understands the
incentives of the sender and knows that the sender will attempt to deceive her. On the
contrary, the credulous type believes all the information that is provided to her and
makes her decision purely based on that evidence. Under this assumption, I can revisit
the results of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. All sequential equilibria of the game with unobservable research effort and
credulous types are characterised by:
(i) The sender reveals all positive signals he obtains and adapts his report of negative signals
to induce the credulous type to set the sender’s preferred policy.
(ii) The sender conducts an amount of research Q(q) solution to:
31 I collected data on efficacy supplements of type N and SE1-SE7 from the FDA website. Note that if one
concentrates only on types N and SE1 that are more specifically trials aimed at finding new applications for
existing drugs, the numbers go from 58 in 2004 and 2005, 59 in 2006 to 38 in 2007.
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C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼Q ðqÞ
 q2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼Q ðqÞ f ðxjh;Q Þf ðhÞdxdh:
(iii) The sender conducts more research than when his research effort is observable
(Q0 < Q
(q)) but less than if he was only faced with a sophisticated receiver
(Q(q) < Q).
Proof. See Appendix.
The first result states that the sender can always deceive the credulous receiver and
induce her to adopt his preferred policy.32 The intuition is the following. Regardless of
the amount of research performed and of the results obtained, the sender reports the
same amount of positive signals as if he was facing only a sophisticated type. The
amount of negative signals is then used to influence the credulous type. Note that the
sophisticated type ignores the report of negative results. She has beliefs about the
amount of research performed and, based on these beliefs and the positive signals
reported, sets her preferred policy. On the contrary, the credulous type takes into
account all the information provided to her, ignoring the fact that the sender could
report selectively.
To illustrate this intuition, consider a specific case. Suppose that given an amount of
research Q and an amount of positive results obtained x, the sender’s preferred policy is
p0  1. The sender cannot fabricate results and therefore cannot report more positive
results than he obtained. It is therefore possible that the best the sender can do when
faced with a sophisticated receiver is to report all x positive signals he gathered and
induce a policy p < p0.
33 However, when he faces a credulous receiver and reports x
positive signals, he can induce any policy in the interval [p, 1] by adapting the number
of negative signals reported. For instance to induce a policy p ¼ 1, he can report no
negative signals. Therefore, by reporting an intermediate amount of negative signals,
the sender can induce the credulous receiver to adopt his preferred policy p0.
The second part of Proposition 4 uses these results on the optimal reporting strategy
to determine the sender’s research decision. The difference between the optimal
amount of research performed in this case compared to the case of Proposition 2 is that
the strategic effect (second line) has a weight q attached to it. Indeed, with probability
(1  q), the receiver is credulous and there is no need to conduct extra research to
convince her that no information is being withheld. This concern is only relevant if the
sender is faced with a sophisticated receiver. Note that as q converges to zero, the
amount of research performed converges to Q0. The goal of research in that case is
strictly to minimise the variance of the posterior distribution.
32 The only exception is when the sender’s preferred policy is greater than 1. The naive receiver can then
be induced to choose a policy exactly equal to 1.
33 If the belief of the sophisticated receiver is that the sender performed an amount of research Q, he sets
the policy as if the information was x positive signals and (Q  x) negative.
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It is essential to determine how this variation on the initial model, aimed at capturing
the application to clinical trials more precisely, affects the conclusions on the welfare
impacts of mandatory disclosure rules. In the presence of credulous receivers, man-
datory disclosure has two effects. First, as previously noted it reduces the amount of
research performed in equilibrium. This could have negative welfare consequences
since the sender often performs socially insufficient amounts of research. However the
existence of credulous receivers has a second consequence. Without mandatory dis-
closure, the credulous receiver sets the sender’s preferred policy, whereas when man-
datory disclosure is introduced she sets her own preferred policy. If the receiver and the
sender receive the same weight in the social welfare function, this does not impact
overall welfare given the quadratic shape of preferences.34 However, if the receiver’s
welfare is deemed more important, this second effect will argue in favour of mandatory
disclosure. Note that this appears to be a reasonable assumption in the case of the
pharmaceutical industry: the weight I put on the welfare of doctors and patients should
probably be higher than the weight on the firms utility. If I note a the weight
put on the receiver’s welfare in the social welfare function (social welfare becomes
a(p  h)2  (p  h  d)2), we obtain the following result:
Corollary 4. If a > 1 there exists a benchmark value q (a) such that if q  q (a)
mandatory disclosure increases social welfare
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 4 indicates that as it becomes increasingly likely that the receiver is credu-
lous, mandatory disclosure becomes the socially preferred policy. As the probability that
the receiver is sophisticated converges to zero, the amount of research performed in the
case without mandatory disclosure (Q(q)) converges to the mandatory disclosure case
(Q0). The effects on research incentives are therefore identical. However, as q converges
to zero, without mandatory disclosure, the receiver nearly always sets the sender’s
preferred policy. Given the weights in the social welfare function this will induce a
negative overall effect on social welfare. Mandatory disclosure becomes the socially
preferred policy. The results of this Section therefore highlight that, although the effect
of mandatory disclosure on research incentives, highlighted in Section 2, are always
relevant, in certain applications, such as clinical trials, adopting the policy preferred by
receivers is essential and argues in favour of mandatory disclosure requirements.35
3.2. Uncertain Bias
The benchmark model makes strong assumptions about the sophistication of the
receivers (issue addressed in the previous Section) but also about the information they
hold. In this Section I address the second concern. Specifically, I assume that the
receiver is uncertain about the bias of the agent. I suppose that the bias can take two
34 This would not necessarily be true for other types of preferences.
35 The two effects of mandatory disclosure, (1) on research incentives (2) on the match between the
chosen policy and the receiver’s preferred policy, appear quite general. Furthermore the sophistication of the
receiver, that could be captured in various way, changes the relative importance of these factors.
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values: dL with probability q and dH with probability 1  q, and that both types are
biased in the same direction (dH > dL > 0). A possible interpretation is that the
receivers (medical journals, doctors or patients) are unaware of all the financial
incentives of the companies, such as the expected profits from the drug, factors that
influence the sender’s bias. Furthermore, to simplify the exposition, I consider the
special case where the distribution of signals takes the particular functional form
f(xjh, Q) ¼ 1x¼hQ (as discussed at the end of Section 2). In this context I obtain the
following result:
Proposition 5. All sequential equilibria of the game with uncertain bias and unobservable
research effort are characterised by:
(i) The low type will conduct less research than the high type ðQ L < Q H Þ.
(ii) For a certain range of results, the high type will withhold positive information (if
x 2 ½Q L ;Qb , the high type reports xr < x).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for result (i) is the following: at his equilibrium level of research, the
marginal gains for the low type from searching for more information to mislead the
receiver equal the marginal costs. The high type, who is more biased, obtains greater
marginal gains from increasing his research effort, but faces the same marginal costs.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the receiver expects more research from the high type as
described in result (i).
Result (ii) surprisingly states that in equilibrium, the high type might withhold
positive information that goes in his favour. This occurs when he obtains results that
indicate an intermediate value for the state. If the range of positive results is close to
Q L but slightly greater, the sender prefers hiding some positive information in order
to avoid revealing his type and have the information he provides be judged on a
stricter basis. This seems in accordance with the example of the clinical trial called
Vigor study conducted by Merck, that was the first to suggest that Vioxx might
increase the risk of cardiovascular incidents. This trial was initially meant to show that
the drug had fewer side-effects on the stomach and intestines than the other drugs in
its category, and successfully proved this. However, both the positive and negative
results were withheld.
In the following Proposition I provide some further characterisation of the equilib-
rium behaviour for a specific distribution of the state: h  U[0, 1].
Proposition 6. Under the assumption that h  U[0, 1], when research is unobservable, there
exits a sequential equilibrium characterised by the amounts Q 0 < QL < QB < QH such that:
(i) If the amount of positive results x is such that x 2 [0,Q0], both types use full disclosure
reporting strategies.
(ii) If the amount of positive results x such that x 2 [Q0,QL], both types pool on one message r
and the receiver sets a unique policy n.
(iii) If the high type obtains an amount of positive results x such that x 2 [QL,QB], he
withholds some positive information and the receiver sets policy n.
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(iv) If the high type obtains an amount of positive results x such that x 2 [QB,QH], he uses a
full disclosure reporting strategy.
(v) The low type conducts less research than if his type was known with certainty.
This Proposition shows that when the research effort is unobservable, two addi-
tional costs could exist in this model with uncertainty. First, result (iii), in accord-
ance with Proposition 5 indicates that positive information might be withheld in
equilibrium. Result (ii) suggests an additional cost might arise: for a certain range
of results (in [Q0,QL]), neither type is able to transmit the information he obtained
credibly and they pool on a single report. The policy chosen by the receiver will
therefore be suboptimal. Result (v) indicates that less research is conducted by
the low type in equilibrium than if his type were known. The intuition is that, in the
reporting phase, it is harder to transmit information credibly and therefore the
marginal benefits from conducting more research to mislead the receiver are
smaller.
In this Section I have tailored the model to the application to clinical trials. When
the sender faces potentially credulous or imperfectly informed receivers, he will not
reveal in equilibrium all the information obtained. The sender withholds negat-
ive signals but might also hide some positive signals to avoid revealing his type.
Finally I show that this will change the attractiveness of mandatory disclosure reg-
ulation. If the probability that the receiver is credulous is sufficiently high, man-
datory disclosure increases social welfare, in spite of the effect on research
incentives highlighted in Section 2, as the policy preferred by the receiver will be
implemented.36
4. Competing Senders
In adversarial judicial systems, the decision maker relies on the information provided
by the interested parties. My model is adapted to examine this setting if I consider that
the decision maker (the judge or the jury) makes inferences from the evidence pro-
duced, possibly about withheld information, and does not naively decide based solely
on the information provided. I am aware that some rules limit the amount of updating
that can be performed.37 However, it seems difficult to prevent juries from making
inferences in all circumstances. My model can be viewed as an extreme case where the
decision maker is completely unconstrained.
To study this environment, I need to extend the model to allow for competing
senders gathering information independently and transmitting it strategically to the
decision maker. Specifically, I suppose the utility function of sender 1 is given by
u1 ¼ (p  h  d1)2 and that of sender 2 is u2 ¼ (p  h  d2)2 (with d1 > 0 and
d2 < 0). I suppose that the receiver knows the type of both agents. As specified in the
previous Section, I use the special case of the model that isolates the strategic
36 Note that mandatory disclosure will also increase social welfare in the case of uncertainty that I con-
sidered. However, I considered the special case where all extra research is a social waste (the information is
immediately revealed). It would be interesting to examine the more general case.
37 In some situations, juries are asked to draw no conclusion from the fact that one party does not provide
evidence.
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function of research, where the distribution of signals takes the particular form
f(x j h,Q) ¼ 1x¼hQ.
In this Section, I choose to describe the reports made by the senders as reports on
the state. The actual reports are the aggregate amounts of positive and negative signals,
but given a set of beliefs of the receiver (that are correct in equilibrium), they are
equivalent to reporting the state. Let p(h1, h2) be the policy set by the decision maker
when she receives message h1 from sender one and h2 from the second sender. On the
equilibrium path, in the next Proposition, both senders employ a full disclosure
reporting strategy and therefore p(h, h) ¼ h. Furthermore, off the equilibrium path, I
impose the following restriction on the belief function.
Restriction A. p(h1, h2) 2 [h2, h1]
Restriction A does not correspond to a particular refinement but is a reasonable
restriction on beliefs. Indeed, sender 1 observes perfectly the state and is biased towards
a higher policy, so he would not voluntarily hide positive signals; the state cannot
be larger than h1. In the same way, sender 2 will never hide negative signals therefore
the state cannot be smaller than h2. Under this Restriction on beliefs we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 7. Under restriction A, all sequential equilibria where the quantity of research
conducted by the sender is not observed by the receiver, are characterised by:
(i) Both types use full disclosure reporting strategies.
(ii) The equilibrium amounts of research Q1,Q2, conducted by each sender are less than if they
were alone to report: Qi < 2diEðhÞ=C ; i ¼ 1; 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The natural conjecture is that competition between senders increases the amount of
research conducted in equilibrium. Proposition 7 leads to the opposite conclusion:
both senders conduct less research than if they were alone to provide information to
the decision maker. The intuition rests on the fact that the information provided by
both parties are perfect substitutes. Given that the other sender is revealing truthfully
his information in equilibrium, the marginal benefits from searching for more signals
to mislead the receiver are smaller than if he were alone to report. Indeed the receiver
will also take into account the information provided by the competitor.38
I can also use these results to comment on the allocation of the burden of proof. I
interpret the burden of proof to be policy set by the receiver p(h1, h2) when the two
senders produce conflicting reports. For instance if p(h1, h2) ¼ h1 the burden of proof
rests entirely on sender 2. I determine the functional form for p(h1, h2) that maximises
social welfare.
38 This result remains valid in the general setup of Section 3 where research has both a strategic function
and an information gathering role. The results on competition obtained in Proposition 7 generalise on both
accounts. The result for the strategic function is identical. Furthermore, the fact that the other sender is
obtaining information to gain a better knowledge of the state, also reduces the benefits from research as an
information tool for the first sender. Combining these two effects, in the general setup, I also obtain that less
research will be conducted by each sender than if they were alone reporting.
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Corollary 5. To maximise social welfare, the burden of proof should rest entirely on the
most biased party.
Proof. See Appendix.
As I pointed out previously, in this special case of the model, where research is
immediately informative, the social optimum is to conduct an infinitesimal amount of
research, sufficient to reveal the state perfectly. The socially optimal belief function will
therefore minimise the aggregate amount of research conducted by both senders.
Section 2 showed that the most biased party needs to conduct more socially wasteful
research to convince the receiver he is not withholding any information. Thus to
minimise the aggregate amount of research, the burden of proof should rest entirely
on the most biased sender to remove his capacity to influence the decision and thus his
incentives to conduct more research to mislead the receiver.
5. Related Literature
The contribution of this article can be seen in several ways. First, I introduce endogenous
information acquisition in a persuasion game. I show that when the sender’s research
effort is not observable, he conducts more costly research to prove he is not withholding
evidence. Second, I evaluate the social benefits of introducing mandatory disclosure of
research results. I show that a social arrangement where research is unobservable can be
socially preferred when the bias of the sender is not too large. I qualify that when the
sender can be credulous. I also introduce uncertainty on the type of the sender and show
that it can lead to withholding in equilibrium, including of positive results.
This article belongs to the literature on persuasion games and is related to the
seminal papers by Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). These papers
introduce the so called unravelling result. They show that, in situations where the
decision maker knows the quantity of information held by the sender, in every
sequential equilibrium of the game, the reporting strategy is one of full disclosure. The
equilibrium is supported by the sceptical beliefs of the receiver.39 Given such beliefs,
the sender will have incentives to reveal all the information he obtained.40 These initial
papers have generated a large literature attempting to relax the full disclosure result.41
I introduce endogenous information acquisition in such a game and show that in
equilibrium, the receiver knows, even though he does not observe, the amount of
information obtained, and the unravelling result applies.
Endogenous information acquisition is also examined in Shavell (1994) in a specific
persuasion game where sellers can make expenditures to acquire information on the
value of a good. The model of information search is the classical one where a unique
signal is obtained, informative with a certain probability. Shavell shows that when
39 If some information is withheld, the sender assumes the worst case scenario. These are the only
admissible beliefs in equilibrium.
40 The sender who obtained the best information, reveals everything and by induction, all types will have
an incentive to disclose all their information.
41 For instance Shin (1994), Dye (1985), Verrechia (2001). Van Zandt and Vives (2006) provide a general
result characterising conditions under which disclosure will occur.
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information acquisition is unobservable, the probability of searching increases, a sim-
ilar result to the one I obtain in Proposition 2 result (iii). However the focus of his
paper and the mechanism underlying this result differ greatly from my own. Shavell’s
model is based on the existence of different types of sellers having different costs in
acquiring information. A type with low cost of searching, searches more often and hides
bad signals, pretending to be a high type who did not search. The consequences of this
result are therefore different from those in my model. He finds that information is
withheld in equilibrium (as opposed to Proposition 2 result (i)). More importantly, the
low types are strictly better off when their research effort is unobservable whereas the
high types are strictly worse off.42 In my model, where I study selective reporting,
Proposition 2 result (iv) concludes that the sender is always strictly worse off as he
needs to conduct more costly research to prove he is not withholding information.
Jovanovic (1982) considers a different question: the problem of disclosure by a seller
who initially holds information but can only disclose it at a cost to a buyer. He shows,
that the seller conducts a socially excessive amount of disclosure. As in the paper by
Shavell, the types with the worst signals are strictly better off if their signal is not
publicly observable. Furthermore, in Jovanovic’s model, decreasing the cost of disclo-
sure will always be socially beneficial. This illustrates the fact that the cost of disclosure
plays a very different role than the cost of research aimed at obtaining valuable
information.
A recent contribution by Milgrom (2008) discusses related issues. He examines
whether a seller will conduct costly testing of his product to provide verifiable evidence
to a buyer. He also notes that a seller has more incentives to test when his effort is not
observed by the buyer.43 However, in the context of his model, the search for informa-
tion is always excessive from a social point of view. In our model, the extra amount of
research performed can be socially beneficial as it corrects an ignored externality.
I noted in the Introduction that one of the applications of this model could be to the
literature on media bias. In that respect my work is linked to the paper by Xiang and
Sarvary (2007) on competition between news outlets. In their model the media have a
binary choice: they can obtain a small quantity of signals about the underlying state at
no cost or they can spend more resources and obtain a larger quantity of information.
In the second case, as in my article, they can select some of the pieces of information if
they want to bias their reporting. Furthermore, they face two types of consumers: some
who want the news to be biased in the direction of their beliefs and some who desire to
uncover the truth. They find that an increase in media bias can increase the quality of
information for the non-biased consumers, a result reminiscent of our Corollary 1.
I also mentioned in the Introduction the application to lobbying. Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2002, 2006) examine the search and transmission of information by a lobby
group. In Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) they show that the lobby group has a
42 I use the notation introduced in Shavell (1994). Consider the lowest type facing cost 0 to obtain
information. Under mandatory disclosure, he obtains E(v) whereas when his search is unobservable he can
expect E(v  v) þ vP(v  v)v > E(v). On the other hand the type facing the highest cost will not search
and will obtain v < E(v), thus strictly preferring mandatory disclosure.
43 As Milgrom (2008) highlights, this result is also similar to the result on moral hazard by Akerlof (1976),
the so called rat race. Each type of worker exerts more effort than socially optimal to differentiate himself
from other types.
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higher incentive to search for information when faced with a legislature rather than a
single agenda setter. The search effort is supposed to be observed by the receiver and
results in a single signal that is informative with a certain probability. Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2006) examine the interaction between informational lobbying and polit-
ical contributions.44
Finally, I can also mention a few other articles more remotely related. The intro-
duction of endogenous search for information has lead to surprising results in other
contexts (Persico, 2000). The competition between information providers was studied
in a different context by Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).45
6. Conclusion
In this article I study the interaction between research and disclosure in a persuasion
game. I find that when the research effort of the sender is not observed by the receiver,
the sender’s welfare is reduced as he needs to conduct more research to prove he is not
withholding information. This extra amount of research can nevertheless be socially
beneficial and I highlight the fact that mandatory disclosure should thus be imple-
mented with caution. I also discuss applications to the disclosure of clinical trial results
and to judicial systems.
The seminal papers by Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have given
rise to a large literature trying to find circumstances where the unravelling result does
not hold. Section 3 in my article highlights two situations where this could occur. The
first is one where the sender is potentially credulous. The second is one where the
receiver is uncertain about certain parameters of the game. This second situation could
even lead to withholding of positive results. Note that in both situations, the interaction
between research and disclosure proves to be essential. However, there still remains a
number of situations where the opportunities to withhold information are poorly
understood. In particular, one interesting direction is to examine cases where the
receiver is unaware of the different discoveries the sender could potentially make. This
article highlights that examining research and disclosure decisions jointly is essential to
approach these type of questions.
Empirical validation could also be an interesting avenue for future research. In this
paper I present some suggestive evidence based on the new policy adopted by the
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors and on the number of trials aimed
at finding new applications for existing drugs. More systematic analysis of these data
could lead to exciting work. The challenge however is to obtain a measure of research
activity before the adoption, when the research effort was still unobservable.
44 The research in this case also leads to a single signal but they suppose in this paper that the search effort
is unobservable. In a working version of that paper they compare the observable and unobservable search case
and show that the probability of searching is higher when the search effort is not observed. This is similar to
Shavell’s result and to my Proposition 2 result (iii). Part of the discussion relative to Shavell’s paper also
applies here.
45 They examine, in a system where contracts specify payments as a function of information obtained,
whether a system with competing advocates dominates one with a single non partisan decision maker. They
show that when evidence is not concealable, the advocacy system is strictly optimal: it gives incentives for
information gathering without abandoning rents.
2009] 1055CO S T O F P RO V I N G Y OU R HON E S T Y
 The Author(s). Journal compilation  Royal Economic Society 2009
Appendix
In a previous version of the article, the results of Propositions 1 to 3 were first presented for a
special case of the model where the distribution of signals took the particular functional form
f(xjh, Q) ¼ 1x¼hQ (model also used in Sections 3 and 4). This simplified the exposition of the
proofs and the derivations of the results. In particular for Proposition 2, the equilibrium amount
of research was given by: Q ¼ 2dE(h)/C. The derivations for Propositions 1 to 3 in this special
case are available upon request.
Proposition 1 The receiver can observe the amount of research performed by the sender. Furthermore, the
utility function of the receiver is strictly concave in p. The unravelling result in Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
Proposition 2 applies. The sender uses a full disclosure reporting strategy in all sequential equilibria: he
reveals all the positive signals and if signals are withheld, the receiver knows that they are negative.
Given that the sender’s reporting strategy is one of full disclosure, I determine the amount of
research performed by the sender. The sender solves the following problem:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½Eðhjx;Q 0Þ  h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh CQ 0:
We have by Bayes rule f(x j h)p(h) ¼ g(h j x)g(x), so the problem can be rewritten:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
ðE½h;Q 0Þ  h d2g ðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdxdh
þ 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½Eðh;Q 0Þ  hdg ðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdxdh
 d2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
g ðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdxdh CQ 0
By definition
R 1
0 ½Eðhjx;Q 0Þ  hg ðh;Q 0Þdh ¼ 0 and
R 1
0 ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2g ðhjx;Q 0Þdh ¼ V ðh;Q 0Þ so the
problem is:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Varðhjx;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx  d2  CQ 0:
Assumption (ii) specified in the description of the model guarantees that this problem has a
unique solution given by the first order conditions of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 I proceed in two steps to prove the different claims of Proposition 2. In step 1 I examine
the reporting strategy and in step 2 we determine the optimal research decision.
Step 1: Reporting strategy
Let Q be the amount of research conducted in equilibrium. I first point out that on the
equilibrium path, when the sender conducts an amount of research Q, Milgrom’s unravelling
result applies as in Proposition 1. The main object of the Proof is therefore to determine the
reporting strategy out of equilibrium.
Suppose the sender conducts an amount of research Q 0 and obtains results x. His desired
policy is then po ¼ E(hjx, Q 0) þ d. I distinguish two cases: (1) po > 1 (2) po  1.
Case (1): po > 1. In this case the optimal policy is never attainable. Indeed, because h 2 [0, 1],
in all sequential equilibria, the receiver always sets a policy in the interval [0, 1]. Given that the
preferences of the sender are single peaked, he wants to induce the highest possible policy. If
x  Q, the report r ¼ x is optimal and is on the equilibrium path. If x > Q, the sender can
obtain policy 1 by reporting r ¼ Q. Regardless of the beliefs of the receiver off the equilibrium
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path, he cannot obtain a higher policy. His optimal reporting strategy is therefore r ¼ Q
independently of the receiver’s beliefs.
Case (2): po  1. In this case the sender’s preferred policy is potentially attainable. His ideal
report is r0 such that E(hjro, Q) ¼ E(hjx, Q 0) þ d. However, the verifiability constraint imposes
ro  x. In this case if ro  x , the optimal report is r ¼ ro. If ro > x, given that the preferences of
the sender are single peaked, the sender wants the highest policy possible. His optimal reporting
strategy is then r ¼ x.46
To summarise the results, in all sequential equilibria, the optimal reporting strategy will
depend on the number x of positive results obtained. There are three types of intervals to
consider. I use the following notation:
Ak such that if x 2 Ak the optimal reporting strategy is r ¼ x
Bk such that if x 2 Bk the optimal reporting strategy is r ¼ Q
Ck such that if x 2 Ck the optimal reporting strategy is r ¼ ro that guarantees the preferred policy.
There could be multiple intervals of each type and for step 2 I consider the most general case
where the exact number of intervals of each type is left unspecified.
Step 2: Optimal research decision
Given his reporting strategy, the sender chooses Q 0, the amount of research he performs, as the
solution to:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
½Eðh;Q Þ  h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
ð1 h dÞ2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Ck
½Eðh;Q 0Þ þ d h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh CQ 0:
Indeed, on intervals Ak, the receiver sets policy p ¼ E (hjx, Q), on interval Bk she sets policy
p ¼ 1 and on Ck the sender’s preferred policy E(hjx, Q 0) þ d is implemented.
The problem of the sender can be rewritten:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
½Eðhjx;Q Þ  h d2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2
n o
f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
fð1 h dÞ2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh

Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh CQ 0:
As in the Proof of Proposition 1, I can rewrite the third term as a function of the variance. The
objective becomes:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx  CQ 0

Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
f½Eðhjx;Q Þ  h d2  ½Eðhjx;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
fð1 h dÞ2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh:
46 Given that ro > x and that E(hjro,Q ) ¼ E(hjx,Q 0) þ d  1 in case 2, x  Q .
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I determine the first order conditions of this maximisation problem:
C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 

Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
f½Eðh;Q Þ  h d2  ½Eðhjx;Q 0Þ  h2g @f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh
þ 2
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
@E
@Q 0
ðh;Q 0Þ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  hf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
fð1 h dÞ2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2g @f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh
þ 2
Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
@E
@Q 0
ðh;Q 0Þ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  hf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞdxdh:
Given that the reporting strategy is continuous, all the derivatives at the boundaries of the
intervals cancel out and thus do not appear in this expression.47
For Q to be an equilibrium these first order conditions need to be satisfied at Q. I consider
the first order conditions at the limit when Q 0 converges to Q. The first thing to observe is
that ¨Ak ! [0, þ1] and ¨Bk ! ;.48 Given that f(x j h, Q 0) is continuously differentiable, the
integrands in the last two terms of the previous expression are continuous. I therefore conclude
that when Q 0 converges to Q, these two terms converge to zero and overall the first order
conditions become:
C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼Q 
þ
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
d½2Eðh;Q Þ  2h d½ @f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼Q pðhÞdxdh
þ 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½ @E
@Q 0
ðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼Q  ½Eðh;Q Þ  hf ðxjh;Q ÞpðhÞdxdh:
I first examine the 3rd term:
2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@E
@Q 0
ðh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q  ½Eðh;Q Þ  hf ðxjh;Q ÞpðhÞdxdh
¼ 2
Z 1
0
@E
@Q 0
ðh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q g ðx;Q 0Þ
Z 1
0
½Eðh;Q Þ  hg ðhjx;Q Þdh
 
dx ¼ 0:
I then simplify the second term:
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
d½2Eðh;Q Þ  2h d @f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q pðhÞdxdh
¼ 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
d2
@f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q pðhÞdxdh
þ
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
2d½Eðh;Q Þ  h @f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q pðhÞdxdh:
47 For instance consider xk at the boundary between an interval Ak and Ck. The expression for the first
order conditions should also contain the term
R 1
0 ½@xk=@Q 0f½Eðhjxk ;Q Þ  h dÞ2  ½Eðhjxk ;Q 0Þ  h2gpðhÞdh.
However at the boundary xk between these intervals E(hjxk,Q ) ¼ E(h j xk,Q 0) þ d and this term cancels out.
Following the same reasoning, all terms at the boundaries disappear.
48 Indeed at the limit, when the receiver has the right beliefs about the quantity of research, there is no
more opportunities to hide information, therefore the ideal policy from the point of view of the sender is
never attainable.
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R 1
0
R1
0 f ðxjh;Q 0Þ pðhÞdxdh ¼ 1. The derivative with respect to Q 0 yields:
R 1
0
R1
0 d
2½@f ðxjh;Q 0Þ=
@Q 0jQ 0pðhÞdxdh ¼ 0.
Also
R 1
0
R1
0 ½Eðhjx;Q 0Þ  h f ðxjh;Q 0Þ pðhÞdxdh ¼ 0. I consider the derivative with respect to Q 0
to simplify the second term:
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
2d½Eðh;Q Þ  h @f
@Q 0
ðxjh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q pðhÞdxdh
¼ 2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@E
@Q 0
ðh;Q 0Þ
 
jQ 0¼Q  f ðxjh;Q ÞpðhÞdxdh:
Therefore, the first order conditions of the initial maximisation problem can be rewritten:
C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼Q 
 2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼Q  f ðxjh;Q ÞpðhÞ dxdh:
I have therefore shown result (ii). Let me now prove the other claims of Proposition 2:
(iii) oE(h j x, Q 0)/oQ 0 is negative because the number of positive signals is weakly increasing in
the quantity of research performed.R1
0 Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx 0Þdx is convex in Q 0 according to the hypothesis made on the variance. I
use these two properties to compare the first order conditions that characterise the
equilibrium amounts of research with the first order condition of Proposition 1. I find that
Q0 < Q
.
(i) As previously explained, in equilibrium, the receiver knows although she does not observe,
the amount of research performed in equilibrium. Therefore, Milgrom’s unravelling result
applies and the equilibrium reporting strategy is one of full disclosure.
(iv) In equilibrium, all the information is revealed. Therefore it is as if the research effort was
observable by the receiver. In the observable case, the optimal choice of the receiver is to conduct
an amount of research Q0. The extra research is therefore costly for the sender and he is strictly
worse off in the unobservable case.
Proposition 3 I first determine the amount of research QW conducted at the social optimum. QW is the
amount of research that maximises the sum of the sender’s and the receiver’s welfare. It is solution to:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh

Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh CQ 0:
The first order conditions corresponding to this problem are:
C
2
¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼QW :
First note that QO < QW: in the observable case, the sender conducts a socially insufficient
amount of research as he ignores the benefits of extra research for the receiver. I also previously
derived the result QO < Q. However, I now need to compare Q and QW to determine whether
social welfare is higher when the research effort is not observed by the receiver. From result (ii)
of Proposition 2, an amount of research QW is attainable in the unobservable case if the following
unit tax on research is imposed:
s ¼ 2d
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼QW f ðxjh;QW Þf ðhÞ dxdh
C
2
:
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In that case the first order conditions that characterise Q that I obtained in Proposition 2 are
equivalent to the first order conditions characterising the social optimum QW. Therefore I have
shown that by imposing such a tax on research, an amount QW will be conducted. Note that this
proves Corollary 3.
If s  0, the amount of research at the social optimum is greater than the amount Q con-
ducted when research is not observed by the receiver (in the unobservable case, research needs
to be subsidised to approach the social optimum). A direct consequence is that the amount
of research conducted in the unobservable case is closer to the social optimum than in the
observable case (the ordering is in this case Q0 < Q
 < QW). Given that the welfare function is
concave in Q, s  0 is a sufficient condition such that social welfare is greater when research is
unobservable. This is the result stated in Proposition 3.
Corollary 2 Let d0 be such that if the sender has bias d0, social welfare is greater when
the research effort is unobservable. From the Proof of Proposition 3 the socially optimal amount of
research QW does not depend on the bias d.
49 On the contrary, Q is strictly increasing in the bias.
Thus for all senders with bias d  d0 social welfare is also greater when the research effort is
unobservable.
Let d00 be such that if the sender has bias d
0
0, social welfare is greater when the research effort is
observable. For identical reasons, for all senders with bias d  d00 social welfare is also greater
when the research effort is observable.
Finally, when d ! 0, the sufficient condition of Proposition 3 is satisfied. Therefore there
always exists d > 0 such that social welfare is greater when the research effort is unobservable if
and only if d  d.
Corollary 3 This Corollary is proved as part of the Proof of Proposition 3 when the socially optimal tax
or subsidy is derived.
Proposition 4 I follow the steps of Proposition 2 and examine how the results are affected by the
possibility of facing credulous receivers.
Step 1: Reporting strategy
I start with the reporting strategy. I show that the sender still reports the same number of positive
signals as when he faced only the sophisticated type but adapts the number of negative signals to
deceive the credulous receiver.
I use the same distinction as in Proposition 2 between the cases (1) p0 > 1 (2) p0  1.50
Case (1): p0 > 1. In this case the best the sender can do is to induce the receiver to set the
policy p ¼ 1. To induce the credulous receiver to do so, it is sufficient to report no negative
signals. Furthermore the amount of positive signals will be determined by the sophisticated type’s
reaction and is therefore identical to the amount in Proposition 2 (if x  Q the report is r ¼ x
and if x > Q the report is r ¼ Q)
Case (2): p0  1. I show that in this case the sender will always be able to induce the
credulous receiver to set policy p0 while reporting the amounts of positive signals as in
Proposition 2. In Proposition 2, the sender, faced with a sophisticated receiver, had an ideal
report r0 such that E(hjr0, Q) ¼ E(hjx, Q 0) þ ds. The verifiability constraint imposed r0  x.
Similarly, in this case, if r0  x, the optimal report is r ¼ r0 positive signals and (Q  r0)
negative signals. Both the sophisticated type and the credulous type will set policy p0. If
49 The first order conditions that characterise QW are independent of d.
50 Where p0 is his desired policy: p0 ¼ E(h j x,Q 0) þ d.
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r0 > x, the optimal strategy when faced with a sophisticated receiver is to report an amount of
positive signals r ¼ x. I now need to show that the amount of negative signals can be adapted
such that the credulous receiver sets policy p0. The sender can induce the credulous receiver
to adopt any policy between [E(h j x, Q 0), 1] by adapting the amount of negative signals. He
can therefore obtain p0 2 [E(h j x, Q 0), 1] by choosing the correct amount of negative signals.
To summarise the results as in the Proof of Proposition 2, in all sequential equilibria, the
optimal reporting strategy will depend on the number x of positive results obtained and can be in
one of three intervals: Ak such that if x 2 Ak the optimal reporting strategy is r ¼ x positive signals.
Policy p0 is set by the credulous receiver and policy E(h j x, Q) by the sophisticated receiver Bk
such that if x 2 Bk the optimal reporting strategy is r ¼ Q positive signals. Policy 1 is set by both
types of receivers Ck such that if x 2 Ck the optimal reporting strategy is r ¼ r0 positive signals.
Policy p0 is set by both types of receiver.
Step 2: Optimal research decision
Given this reporting strategy, I reconsider the research decision of the sender. The amount of
research performed Q 0 is solution to:
maxQ 0  q
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
½Eðhjx;Q Þ  h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh
 ð1 qÞ
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
½Eðh;Q 0Þ þ d h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
ð1 h dÞ2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Ck
½Eðh;Q 0Þ þ d h d2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh CQ 0:
The problem of the sender can be rewritten:
maxQ 0  q
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
f½Eðh;Q Þ  h d2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh
 ð1 qÞ
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
f½Eðh;Q 0Þ þ d h d2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
fð1 h dÞ2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh

Z 1
0
Z 1
0
½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2f ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh CQ 0:
The objective becomes:
maxQ 0 
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx  CQ 0
 q
Z 1
0
Z
[Ak
f½Eðh;Q Þ  h d2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh

Z 1
0
Z
[Bk
fð1 h dÞ2  ½Eðh;Q 0Þ  h2gf ðxjh;Q 0ÞpðhÞ dxdh:
The only change is the factor q that precedes the second term. The calculation of Proposition 2
can therefore be reproduced and the first order conditions of the initial maximisation problem
can be rewritten:
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C ¼  @
@Q 0
Z 1
0
Varðh;Q 0Þg ðx;Q 0Þdx
 
jQ 0¼Q 
 2dq
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
@
@Q 0
½Eðh;Q 0ÞjQ 0¼Q  f ðxjh;Q ÞpðhÞ dxdh::
This concludes the Proof of Proposition 4.
Corollary 4 As q converges to zero, Q(q) converges to Q0.
As q converges to zero, without mandatory disclosure, the policy set by the receiver converges to
the sender’s preferred policy. With mandatory disclosure, the policy set by the receiver is her
preferred policy. Given that a > 1 for small values of q, mandatory disclosure will increase overall
welfare.
Proposition 5 I remind the reader that I use in the rest of the proofs a special version of the model that
isolates the strategic function of research. Specifically, I suppose that the distribution of signals takes a
particular form f(xjh, Q) ¼ 1x¼hQ : if the sender conducts an amount Q of research, he knows for sure he will
obtain hQ positive signals and will therefore be able to infer the exact value of the state. Note that with this
functional form, result (ii) of Proposition 2 indicates that in a case with a single sender, the amount of
research conducted is Q ¼ 2dE(h)/c.51 I prove the result in the case where biases are large, i.e the sender
always wants to report all the positive signals he obtains, but the results are also valid with small biases.
(i) Suppose in equilibrium QL ¼ QH. Both types will then employ the same reporting
strategy of full disclosure. In that case, the equilibrium condition for the low type is given
by QL ¼ 2dLE(h)/C. So if QL ¼ QH, the consequence is that QH < 2dHE(h)/C and
therefore this cannot be an equilibrium condition as according to the proof of Propo-
sition 2 the high type would have incentives to search further to mislead the receiver.
Therefore, in equilibrium, QL < QH.
(ii) Assume there exists an equilibrium where all the positive information is always reported
by both types. Suppose the high type obtains an amount of positive signals x ¼ Q L þ  (
infinitesimal), if he reports all his positive information, he reveals his type and the policy
is therefore set at p ¼ ðQ L þ Þ=Q H . If he hides part of his results, and reports x ¼ Q L he
will obtain a strictly higher policy: p ¼ Q L=½pQ L þ ð1 pÞQ H . Therefore this cannot be
equilibrium behaviour. For a certain range of results x, some positive signals will be
withheld.
Proposition 6 According to Proposition 5, in all equilibria, if the high type obtains an amount of
positive signals close but greater than QL, he will not report all of these signals. However, there cannot exist an
equilibrium where, in such situations, the high type always report QL positive signals. Indeed, the low type
would then never report QL and the equilibrium would break down. Therefore, there exists 2 values Q0 and QB
such that:
If research yields a quantity of positive signals in [0, Q0], all the signals are reported.
If research yields a quantity of positive signals in [Q0, QB] ,both types pool their reports and the
decision maker sets a policy n.
If research yields a quantity of positive signals in [QB, QH], the high type uses a reporting
strategy of full disclosure.
In the case where the state h is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], the following
properties have to be true in equilibrium:
51 For that particular research function I have f(xjh, Q) ¼ 1x¼hQ and E(hjx, Q) ¼ x/Q.
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QB is such that n ¼ QB/QH (at QB, the high type is indifferent between reporting truthfully and
revealing his type and obtaining the policy n).
n ¼ q(QL  Q0)/QL þ (1  q)[(QB  Q0)/QH]. The policy is set at the expected value of the
state given the reports.
Finally, we prove result (v). I study in this example a particular equilibrium where at Q0, the
sender is exactly indifferent between obtaining n and reporting Q0. This means I impose the
condition n ¼ qQ0/QL þ (1  q)Q0/QH. However, other equilibria exist where n > qQ0/
QL þ (1  q)Q0/QH. Under this condition I obtain n ¼ q/(1 þ q).
The amount of research Q 0 is solution to:
maxQ 0 
Z Q0
Q 0
0
q
hQ 0
QL
þ ð1 qÞ hQ
0
QH
 h di
 2
f ðhÞdh
Z n
Q 0
Q0
Q 0
ðn  h diÞ2f ðhÞdh

Z QH
Q 0
n
Q 0
hQ 0
QH
 h di
 2
f ðhÞdh CQ 0:
The first order conditions for the low type can be written
2
Z Q0
QL
0
h
n
Q0
 
QL
Q0
hn  h dL
 
f ðhÞdh ¼ C :
I want to show that QL is smaller than if his type was known. A consequence of the previous
equation is that:
2
Z Q0
QL
0
h
n
Q0
 
dLf ðhÞdh ¼ C þ 2
Z Q0
QL
0
h
n
Q0
 
QL
Q0
hn  h
 
f ðhÞdh > C :
Therefore, using the uniform distribution, I have dLQ0=Q 2L n > C and because Q0 < QL, I have
Q L < dL=C . This second term is exactly the amount of research performed if the type was known,
when the state is distributed uniformly.
Proposition 7 In equilibrium, sender 2 uses a reporting strategy of full disclosure, so the problem of
sender 1 is:
maxQ 0 
Z Q =Q 0
0
pðhQ
0
Q 
; hÞ  h d
 2
f ðhÞdh
Z 1
Q =Q 0
½pð1; hÞ  h d2f ðhÞdh CQ 0:
The first order conditions are:
C ¼ 2
Z Q =Q 0
0
h
Q 
@p
@h1
hQ 0
Q 
; h
 
pðhQ
0
Q 
; hÞ  h d
 
f ðhÞdh:
The first order conditions at the equilibrium become:
Q  ¼ 2
C
Z 1
0
h
@p
@h1
ðh; hÞ½pðh; hÞ  h df ðhÞdh ¼ 2d
C
Z 1
0
h
@p
@h1
ðh; hÞf ðhÞdh:
This gives have: @p=@h1ðh; hÞ ¼ limh!0f½pðhþ h; hÞ  pðh; hÞ=hg
Restriction A implies h  p(h þ h,h)  h þ h. Therefore, I have 0  @p=@h1ðh; hÞ  1.
So, we find Q   2d=C R 10 hf ðhÞdh
Corollary 5 In this special case of the model, the social optimum is to conduct an infinitesimal
amount of research, sufficient to reveal perfectly the state. Therefore the belief function that maximises social
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welfare is one that minimises the aggregate amount of research conducted Q1 þ Q2. From the Proof of
Proposition 6, I know that:
Q 1 þ Q 2 ¼
2d1
C
Z 1
0
h
@p
@h1
ðh; hÞf ðhÞdh 2d2
C
Z 1
0
h
@p
@h2
ðh; hÞf ðhÞdh:
It is immediate to see that if d1 > d2 > 0, the optimal solution is to set p(h1, h2) ¼ h2 (i.e set
op/oh1(h, h) ¼ 0).
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